PROLOGUE

The Strange Death of Silas Deane

The rumors floating around London pointed to suicide. But “what really happened” to Silas Deane could not be discovered unless historians rejected the notion that they were merely couriers between the past and present.

The writing of history is one of the most familiar ways of organizing human knowledge. And yet, if familiarity has not always bred contempt, it has at least encouraged a good deal of misunderstanding. All of us meet history at a tender age when tales of the past easily blend with heroic myths of the culture. In Golden Books, Abe Lincoln looms every bit as large as Paul Bunyan, while George Washington’s cherry tree gets chopped down yearly with almost as much ritual as St. Nick’s Christmas tree goes up. Despite this long familiarity, or perhaps because of it, most students absorb the required facts about the past without any real conception of what history is. Even worse, most think they do know what it is and never get around to discovering what they missed.

“History is what happened in the past.” That statement is the everyday view of the matter. It supposes that historians must return to the past through the surviving records and bring it back to the present to display as “what really happened.” The everyday view recognizes that this task is often difficult. But historians are said to succeed if they bring back the facts without distorting them or forcing a new perspective on them. In effect, historians are seen as couriers between the past and present. Like all good messengers, they are expected simply to deliver their information without adding to it.

This everyday view of history is profoundly misleading. In order to demonstrate how it is misleading, we would like to examine in detail an event that “happened in the past”—the death of Silas Deane. Deane does not appear in most American history texts, and rightly so. He served as a distinctly second-rank diplomat for the United States during the years of the American Revolution. Yet the story of Deane’s death is an excellent example of an event that
cannot be understood merely by transporting it, courier-like, to the present. In short, it illustrates the important difference between “what happened in the past” and what history really is.

**AN UNTIMELY DEATH**

Silas Deane’s career began with one of those rags-to-riches stories so much appreciated in American folklore. In fact, Deane might have made a lasting place for himself in the history texts, except that his career ended with an equally dramatic riches-to-rags story.

He began life as the son of a humble blacksmith in Groton, Connecticut. The blacksmith had aspirations for his boy and sent him to Yale College, where Silas was quick to take advantage of his opportunities. After studying law, Deane opened a practice near Hartford; he then continued his climb up the social ladder by marrying a well-to-do widow, whose inheritance included the business of her late husband, a merchant. Conveniently, Deane became a merchant. After his first wife died, he married the granddaughter of a former governor of Connecticut.

Not content to remain a prospering businessman, Deane entered politics. He served on Connecticut’s Committee of Correspondence and later as a delegate to the first and second Continental Congresses, where he attracted the attention of prominent leaders, including Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, and John Jay. In 1776 Congress sent Deane to France as the first American to represent the united colonies abroad. His mission was to purchase badly needed military supplies for the Revolutionary cause. A few months later, Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee joined him in an attempt to arrange a formal treaty of alliance with France. The American commissioners concluded the alliance in March 1778.

Deane worked hard to progress from the son of a blacksmith all the way to Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States to the Court of France. Most observers described him as ambitious: someone who thoroughly enjoyed fame, honor, and wealth. “You know his ambition—” wrote John Adams to one correspondent, “his desire of making a Fortune. . . . You also know his Art and Enterprise. Such Characters are often useful, altho always to be carefully watched and contracted, specially in such a government as ours.” One man in particular suspected Deane enough to watch him: Arthur Lee, the third member of the American mission. Lee accused Deane of taking unfair advantage of his official position to make a private fortune—as much as £50,000, some said. Deane stoutly denied the accusations, and Congress engaged in a heated debate over his conduct. In 1778 it voted to recall its Minister Plenipotentiary, although none of the charges had been conclusively proved.

Deane embroiled himself in further controversy in 1781, having written friends to recommend that America sue for peace and patch up the quarrel with England. His letters were intercepted, and copies of them turned up in
“You know his ambition—his desire of making a fortune... You also know his Art and Enterprise. Such Characters are often useful, altho always to be carefully watched and contracted, specially in such a government as ours.”—John Adams on Silas Deane.

a New York Tory newspaper just after Cornwallis surrendered to Washington at Yorktown. For Deane, the timing could not have been worse. With American victory complete, anyone advocating that the United States rejoin Britain was considered as much a traitor as Benedict Arnold. So Deane suddenly found himself adrift. He could not return to America, for no one would have him. Nor could he go to England without confirming his reputation as a traitor. And he could not stay in France, where he had injudiciously accused Louis XVI of aiding the Americans for purely selfish reasons. Rejected on all sides, Deane took refuge in Flanders.

The next few years of his life were spent unhappily. Without friends and with little money, he continued in Flanders until 1783, when the controversy
had died down enough for him to move to England. There he lived in obscurity, took to drink, and wound up boarding at the house of an unsavory prostitute. The only friend who remained faithful to him was Edward Bancroft, another Connecticut Yankee who, as a boy, had been Deane’s pupil and later his personal secretary during the Paris negotiations for the alliance. Although Bancroft’s position as a secretary seemed innocent enough, members of the Continental Congress knew that Bancroft was also acting as a spy for the Americans, using his connections in England to secure information about the British ministry’s war plans. With the war concluded, Bancroft was back in London. Out of kindness, he provided Deane with living money from time to time.

Finally, Deane decided he could no longer live in London and in 1789 booked passage on a ship sailing for the United States. When Thomas Jefferson heard the news, he wrote his friend James Madison: “Silas Deane is coming over to finish his days in America, not having one sou to subsist on elsewhere. He is a wretched monument of the consequences of a departure from right.”

The rest of the sad story could be gotten from the obituaries. Deane boarded the Boston Packet in mid-September, and it sailed out of London down the Thames River to the Atlantic. A storm came up, however, and on September 19 the ship lost both its anchors and beat a course for safer shelter, to wait out the storm. On September 22, while walking the quarterdeck with the ship’s captain, Deane suddenly “complain’d of a dizziness in his head, and an oppression at his stomach.” The captain immediately put him to bed. Deane’s condition worsened; twice he tried to say something, but no one was able to make out his words. A “drowsiness and insensibility continually incroached upon his faculties,” and only four hours after the first signs of illness he breathed his last.

Such, in outline, was the rise and fall of the ambitious Silas Deane. The story itself seems pretty clear, although certainly people might interpret it in different ways. Thomas Jefferson thought Deane’s unhappy career demonstrated “the consequences of a departure from right,” whereas one English newspaper more sympathetically attributed his downfall to the mistake of “placing confidence in his [American] Compatriots, and doing them service before he had got his compensation, of which no well-bred Politician was before him ever guilty.” Yet either way, the basic story remains the same—the same, that is, until the historian begins putting together a more complete account of Deane’s life. Then some of the basic facts become clouded.

For example, a researcher familiar with the correspondence of Americans in Europe during 1789 would realize that a rumor had been making its way around London in the weeks following Deane’s death. According to certain people, Deane had become depressed by his poverty, ill health, and low reputation, and consequently had committed suicide. John Cutting, a New England
merchant and friend of Jefferson, mentioned the rumor that Deane "had 
predetermin'd to take a sufficient quantity of Laudanum [a form of opium] to 
ensure his dissolution" before the boat could sail for America. John Quincy 
Adams heard that "every probability" of the situation suggested Deane's death 
was "voluntary and self-administered." And Tom Paine, the famous pamphle-
teer, also reported the gossip: "Cutting told me he took poison."

At this point we face a substantial problem. Obviously, historians cannot 
rest content with the facts that come most easily to hand. They must search 
the odd corners of libraries and letter collections in order to put together a 
complete story. But how do historians know when their research is "com-
plete"? How do they know to search one collection of letters rather than 
another? These questions point up the misconception at the heart of the 
everyday view of history. History is not "what happened in the past"; rather, 
it is the act of selecting, analyzing, and writing about the past. It is some-
thing that is done, that is constructed, rather than an inert body of data that 
lies scattered through the archives.

The distinction is important. It allows us to recognize the confusion in 
the question of whether a history of something is "complete." If history were 
merely "what happened in the past," there would never be a "complete" his-
tory of Silas Deane—or even a complete history of the last day of his life. 
The past holds an infinite number of facts about those last days, and they 
could never all be included in a historical account.

The truth is, no historian would want to include all the facts. Here, for 
example, is a list of items from the past that might form part of a history of 
Silas Deane. Which ones should be included?

Deane is sent to Paris to help conclude a treaty of alliance. 
Arthur Lee accuses him of cheating his country to make a private profit. 
Deane writes letters that make him unpopular in America. 
He goes into exile and nearly starves. 
Helped out by a gentleman friend, he buys passage on a ship for America as 
his last chance to redeem himself. 
He takes ill and dies before the ship can leave; rumors suggest he may have 
committed suicide.

*   *   *

Ben Franklin and Arthur Lee are members of the delegation to Paris. 
Edward Bancroft is Deane's private secretary and an American spy. 
Men who know Deane say he is talented but ambitious and ought to be 
watched.

*   *   *

Before Deane leaves, he visits an American artist, John Trumbull. 
The Boston Packet is delayed for several days by a storm. 
On the last day of his life, Deane gets out of bed in the morning.
He puts on his clothes and buckles his shoes.
He eats breakfast.
When he takes ill, he tries to speak twice.
He is buried several days later.

Even this short list demonstrates the impossibility of including all the facts. For behind each one lie hundreds more. You might mention that Deane put on his clothes and ate breakfast, but consider also: What color were his clothes? When did he get up that morning? What did he have for breakfast? When did he leave the table? All these things “happened in the past,” but only a comparatively small number of them can appear in a history of Silas Deane.

Readers may object that we are placing too much emphasis on this process of selection. Surely, a certain amount of good judgment will suggest which facts are important. Who needs to know what color Deane’s clothes were or when he got up from the breakfast table?

Admittedly, this objection has some merit, as the list of facts about Deane demonstrates. The list is divided into three groups, roughly according to the way common sense might rank them in importance. The first group contains facts that every historian would be likely to include. The second group contains less important information, which could either be included or left out. (It might be useful, for instance, to know who Arthur Lee and Edward Bancroft were, but not essential.) The last group contains information that appears to be either too detailed or else unnecessary. Deane may have visited John Trumbull, but then he surely visited other people as well. Why include any of that? Knowing that the Boston Packet was delayed by a storm reveals little about Silas Deane. And readers will assume without being told that Deane rose in the morning, put on his clothes, and had breakfast.

But if common sense helps select evidence, it also produces a good deal of pedestrian history. The fact is, the straightforward account of Silas Deane we have just presented has actually managed to miss the most fascinating parts of the story.

Fortunately, one enterprising historian named Julian Boyd was not satisfied with the traditional account of the matter. He examined the known facts of Deane’s career and put them together in ways that common sense had not suggested. Take, for example, two items on our list: (1) Deane was down on his luck and left in desperation for America; and (2) he visited John Trumbull. One fact is from the “important” items on the list and the other from items that seem incidental. How do they fit together?

To answer that, we have to know the source of information about the visit to Trumbull’s, which is the letter from John Cutting informing Jefferson of Deane’s rumored suicide.

A subscription had been made here chiefly by Americans to defray the expense of getting [Deane] out of this country. . . . Dr. Bancroft with great humanity
and equal discretion undertook the management of the man and his business. Accordingly his passage was engaged, comfortable cloaths and stores for his voyage were laid in, and apparently without much reluctance he embarked. . . . I happen'd to see him a few days since at the lodging of Mr. Trumbull and thought I had never seen him look better.

We are now in a better position to see how our two items fit together. And as Julian Boyd has pointed out, they don't fit. According to the first, Deane was depressed, dejected, almost starving. According to the second, he had "never looked better." Alert historians begin to get nervous when they see contradictions like that, so they hunt around a little more. And Julian Boyd found, among the collection of papers published by the Connecticut and New York historical societies, that Deane had been writing letters of his own.

One went to his brother-in-law in America, who had agreed to help pay Deane's transportation over and to receive him when he arrived—something that nobody had been willing to do for years. Other letters reveal that Deane had plans for what he would do when he finally returned home. He had seen models in England of the new steam engines, which he hoped might operate gristmills in America. He had talked to friends about getting a canal built from Lake Champlain in New York to the St. Lawrence River in order to promote trade. As early as 1785 Deane had been at work drumming up support for his canal project. He had even laboriously calculated the cost of the canal's construction ("Suppose a labourer to dig and remove six feet deep and eight feet square in one day. . . . 2,933 days of labour will dig one mile in length, twenty feet wide and eight feet deep.")

Was Deane really depressed enough to commit suicide? Or looking forward to a chance to clear his name?

Obviously, Deane looked forward to a promising future.

Lastly, Deane appeared to believe that the controversy surrounding his French mission had finally died down. As he wrote an American friend,

It is now almost ten years since I have solicited for an impartial inquiry [into the dispute over my conduct] . . . that justice might be done to my fortune and my character. . . . You can sufficiently imagine, without my attempting to describe, what I must have suffered on every account during so long a period of anxiety and distress. I hope that it is now drawing to a close.

Other letters went to George Washington and John Jay, reiterating Deane's innocence.

All this information makes the two items on our list even more puzzling. If Deane was depressed and discouraged, why was he so enthusiastic about coming back to build canals and gristmills? If he really believed that his time of "anxiety and distress" was "drawing to a close," why did he commit suicide? Of course, Deane might have been subject to dramatic shifts in mood.
Perhaps hope for the future alternated with despair about his chances for success. Perhaps a sudden fit of depression caused him to take his life.

But another piece of "unimportant" information, way down in the third group of our list, makes this hypothesis difficult to accept. After Deane's ship left London, it was delayed offshore for more than a week. Suppose Deane did decide to commit suicide by taking an overdose of laudanum. Where did he get the drug? Surely not by walking up to the ship's surgeon and asking for it. He must have purchased it in London, before he left. Yet he remained on shipboard for more than a week. If Deane bought the laudanum during a temporary "fit" of depression, why did he wait a week before taking it? And if his depression was not just a sudden fit, how do we explain the optimistic letters to America?

This close look at three apparently unrelated facts indicates that perhaps there is more to Deane's story than meets the eye. It would be well, then, to reserve judgment about our first reconstruction of Silas Deane's career and try to find as much information about the man as possible—whether or not it seems relevant at first. That means investigating not only Deane himself but also his friends and associates, such as Ben Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Edward Bancroft. Since it is impossible in this prologue to look closely at all of Deane's acquaintances, for purpose of example we will take only one: his friend Bancroft.

**Silas Deane's Friend**

Edward Bancroft was born in Westfield, Massachusetts, where his stepfather presided over a respectable tavern, the Bunch of Grapes. Bancroft was a clever fellow, and his father soon apprenticed him to a physician. Like many boys before him, Edward did not fancy his position and so ran away to sea. Unlike many boys, he managed to make the most of his situation. His ship landed in Barbados, and there Bancroft signed on as the surgeon for a plantation in Surinam, also known as Guiana. The plantation owner, Paul Wentworth, liked the young man and let him use his private library for study. In addition, Bancroft met another doctor who taught him much about the area's exotic tropical plants and animals. When Bancroft returned to New England in 1766 and continued on to London the following year, he knew enough about Surinam's wildlife to publish a book entitled *An Essay on the Natural History of Guiana in South America*. It was well received by knowledgeable scholars and, among other things, established that an electric eel's shock was caused by electricity, a fact not previously recognized.

A young American bright enough to publish a book at age twenty-five and to experiment with electric eels attracted the attention of another electrical experimenter then in London, Ben Franklin. Franklin befriended Bancroft and introduced him to many influential colleagues, not only learned philosophers but also the politicians with whom Franklin worked as colonial
agent for Pennsylvania. A second trip to Surinam produced more research on plants used in making color dyes, research so successful that Bancroft soon found himself elected to the prestigious Royal Society of Medicine. At the same time, Franklin led Bancroft into the political arena, both public and private. On the public side, Bancroft published a favorable review of Thomas Jefferson’s pamphlet *A Summary View of the Rights of British America*; privately, he joined Franklin and other investors in an attempt to gain a charter for land along the banks of the Ohio River.

Up to this point we have been able to sketch Bancroft’s career without once mentioning the name of Silas Deane. Common sense would suggest that the information about Bancroft’s early travels, his scientific studies, his friends in Surinam, tell us little about Deane, and that the story ought to begin with a certain letter Bancroft received from Deane in June 1776. (Common sense is again wrong, but we must wait a little to discover why.)

The letter, which came to Bancroft in 1776, informed him that his old friend Silas Deane was coming to France as a merchant engaged in private business. Would Bancroft be interested in crossing over from England to meet Deane at Calais to catch up on news for old time’s sake? An invitation like that very likely have attracted Bancroft’s curiosity. He did know Deane, who had been his teacher in 1758, but not very well. Why would Deane now write and suggest a meeting? Bancroft may have guessed the rest, or he may have known it from other contacts; in any case, he wrote his “old friend” that he would make all possible haste for Calais.

The truth of the matter, as we know, was that Deane had come to France to secure military supplies for the colonies. Franklin, who was back in Philadelphia, had suggested to Congress’s Committee of Secret Correspondence that Deane contact Bancroft as a good source of information about British war plans. Bancroft could easily continue his friendship with English officials, because he did not have the reputation of being a hotheaded American patriot. So Deane met Bancroft at Calais in July, and the two concluded their arrangements. Bancroft would be Deane’s “private secretary” when needed in Paris and a spy for the Americans when in England.

It turned out that Deane’s arrangement worked well—perhaps a little too well. Legally, Deane was permitted to collect a commission on all the supplies he purchased for Congress, but he went beyond that. He and Bancroft used their official connections in France to conduct a highly profitable private trade of their own. Deane, for instance, sometimes sent ships from France without declaring whether they were loaded with private or public goods. Then if the ships arrived safely, he would declare that the cargo was private, his own. But if the English navy captured the goods on the high seas, he labeled it government merchandise and the public absorbed the loss.

Deane used Bancroft to take advantage of his official position in other ways. Both men speculated in the London insurance markets, which were the eighteenth-century equivalent of gambling parlors. Anyone who wished
could take out “insurance” against a particular event that might happen in
the future. An insurer, for example, might quote odds on the chances of
France going to war with England within the year. The insured would pay
whatever premium he wished, say £1,000, and if France did go to war and
the odds had been five-to-one against it, the insured would receive £5,000.
Wagers were made on almost any public event: which armies would win
which battles, which politicians would fall from power, and even whether a
particular lord would die before the year was out.

Obviously, someone who had access to inside information—someone who
knew in advance, for instance, that France was going to war with England—
could win a fortune. That was exactly what Bancroft and Deane
decided to do. Deane was in charge
of concluding the French alliance,
and he knew that if he succeeded,
Britain would be forced to declare
war on France. Bancroft hurried across to London as soon as the treaty had
been concluded and took out the proper insurance before the news went
public. The profits shared by the two men from this and similar ventures
amounted to approximately £10,000. Like most gamblers, however, Deane
also lost wagers. In the end, he netted little for his troubles.

Historians know these facts because they now have access to the papers
of Deane, Bancroft, and others. Acquaintances of the two men lacked this
advantage, but they suspected shady dealings anyway. Arthur Lee pub-
licly accused Deane and Bancroft of playing the London insurance game.
(Deane shot back that Lee was doing the same thing.) And the moralistic
John Adams found Bancroft’s conduct distasteful. Bancroft, according to
Adams, was

a meddler in stocks as well as reviews, and frequently went into the alley,
and into the deepest and darkest retirements and recesses of the brokers and
jobbers . . . and found amusement as well, perhaps, as profit, by listening to
all the news and anecdotes, true or false, that were there whispered or more
boldly pronounced. . . . This man had with him in France, a woman with
whom he lives, and who by the French was called La Femme de Monsieur
Bancroft. At tables he would season his foods with such enormous quantities
of cayenne pepper which assisted by generous burgundy would set his tongue
a running in the most licentious way both at table and after dinner.

Yet for all Bancroft’s dubious habits, and for all the suspicions of men like
Lee and Adams, there was one thing that almost no one at the time sus-
pected, and that not even historians discovered until the records of certain
British officials were opened to the public more than a century later. Edward
Bancroft was a double agent.

At the end of July 1776, after he had arranged to be Deane’s secretary,
Bancroft returned to England and met with Paul Wentworth, his friend
from Surinam, who was then working in London for Britain’s intelligence
organization. Immediately Wentworth realized how valuable Bancroft would be as a spy and introduced him to two secretaries of state. They in turn persuaded Bancroft to submit reports on the American negotiations in France. For his services, he received a lifetime pension of £200 a year—a figure the British were only too happy to pay for such good information. So quick was Bancroft's reporting that the secretaries of state knew about the American mission to France even before the United States Congress could confirm that Deane had arrived safely.

Eventually, Bancroft discovered that he could pass his information directly to the British ambassador at the French court. To do so, he wrote innocent letters on the subject of "gallantry" and signed them "B. Edwards." On the same paper would go another note written in invisible ink, to appear only when the letter was dipped in a special developer held by Lord Stormont, the British ambassador. Bancroft left his letters every Tuesday morning in a sealed bottle in a hole near the trunk of a tree on the south terrace of the Tuileries, the royal palace. Lord Stormont's secretary would put any return information near another tree on the same terrace. With this system in operation, Stormont could receive intelligence without having to wait for it to filter back from England.

Did any Americans suspect Bancroft of double-dealing? Arthur Lee once claimed he had evidence to charge Bancroft with treason, but he never produced it. In any case, Lee had a reputation for suspecting everybody of everything. Franklin, for his part, shared lodgings with Deane and Bancroft during their stays in Paris. He had reason to guess that someone close to the American mission was leaking secrets—especially when Lord Stormont and the British newspapers made embarrassingly accurate accusations about French aid. The French wished to keep their assistance secret in order to avoid war with England as long as possible, but of course Franklin knew America would fare better with France fighting, so he did little to stop the leaks. "If I was sure," he remarked, "that my valet de place was a spy, as he probably is, I think I should not discharge him for that, if in other respects I liked him." So the French would tell Franklin he really ought to guard his papers more closely, and Franklin would say yes, yes, he really would have to do something about that; and the secrets continued to leak. Perhaps Franklin suspected Deane and Bancroft of playing the London insurance markets, but there is no evidence that he knew Bancroft was a double agent.

What about Deane, who was closer to Bancroft than anyone else? We have no proof that he shared the double agent's secret, but his alliance with Bancroft in other intrigues tells against him. Furthermore, one published leak pointed to a source so close to the American commissioners that Franklin began to investigate. As Julian Boyd has pointed out, Deane immediately directed suspicion toward a man he knew perfectly well was not a spy. We can only conclude he did so to help throw suspicion away from Bancroft. Very likely, if Bancroft was willing to help Deane play his games with the London insurers, Deane was willing to assist Bancroft in his game with British intelligence.
The Tuileries, much as it appeared when Bancroft and Lord Stormont used the south terrace as a drop for their secret correspondence. The royal palace overlooks a magnificent formal garden that, as a modern observer has noted, "seems so large, so full of surprising hidden corners and unexpected stairways, that its strict ground plan—sixteen carefully spaced and shaped gardens of trees, separated by arrow-straight walks—is not immediately discernable."

Of the two, Bancroft seems to have made out better. While Deane suffered reproof and exile for his conduct, Bancroft returned to England still respected by both the Americans and the British. Not that he had been without narrow escapes. Some of the British ministry (the king especially) did not trust him, and he once came close to being hanged for treason when his superiors rightly suspected that he had associated with John the Painter, an unbalanced fanatic who tried to set England's navy ablaze. But Bancroft left for Paris at the first opportunity, waited until the storm blew over, and returned to London at the end of the war with his lifetime pension raised to £1,000 a year. At the time of Deane's death, he was doing more of his scientific experiments, in hopes that Parliament would grant him a profitable monopoly on a new process for making dyes.

Deane's Death: A Second Look

So we finally arrive, the long way around, back where the story began: September 1789 and Deane's death. But now we have a much larger store of information out of which to construct a narrative. Since writing history
involves the acts of analyzing and selecting, let us review the results of our investigation.

We know that Deane was indeed engaged in dubious private ventures, ventures Congress would have condemned as unethical. We also have reason to suspect that Deane knew Bancroft was a spy for the British. Combining that evidence with what we already know about Deane’s death, we might theorize that Deane committed suicide because, underneath all his claims to innocence, he knew he was guilty as Congress charged. The additional evidence, in other words, reveals a possible new motive for Deane’s suicide.

Yet this theory presents definite problems. In the first place, Deane never admitted any wrongdoing to anyone—not in all the letters he wrote, not in any of his surviving papers. That does not mean he was innocent, nor even that he believed himself innocent. But often it is easier for a person to lie to himself than to his friends. Perhaps Deane actually convinced himself that he was blameless, that he had a right to make a little extra money from his influential position, and that he did no more than anyone would in his situation. Certainly his personal papers point to that conclusion. And if Deane believed himself innocent—correctly or not—would he have any obvious motive for suicide? Furthermore, the theory does not explain the puzzle that started this investigation. If Deane felt guilty enough about his conduct to commit suicide, why did that guilt increase ten years after the fact? If he did feel suddenly guilty, why wait a week aboard ship before taking the fatal dose of laudanum? For that matter, why go up and chat with the captain when death was about to strike?

No, things still do not sit quite right, so we must question the theory. What proof do we have that Deane committed suicide? Rumors about London. Tom Paine heard it from Cutting, the merchant. And Cutting reports in his letter to Jefferson that Deane’s suicide was “the suspicion of Dr. Bancroft.” How do we know the circumstances of Deane’s death? The captain made a report, but for some reason it was not preserved. The one account that did survive was written by Bancroft, at the request of a friend. Then there were the anonymous obituaries in the newspapers. Who wrote them? Very likely Bancroft composed at least one; certainly, he was known as Silas Deane’s closest friend and would have been consulted by any interested parties. There are a lot of strings here, which, when pulled hard enough, all run back to the affable Dr. Bancroft. What do we know about his situation in 1789?

We know Bancroft is dependent on a pension of £1,000 a year, given him for his faithful service as a British spy. We know he is hoping Parliament will grant him a monopoly for making color dyes. Suddenly his old associate Deane, who has been leading a dissolute life in London, decides to return to America, vindicate himself to his former friends, and start a new life. Put yourself in Bancroft’s place. Would you be just a little nervous about that
idea? Here is a man down on his luck, now picking up and going to America
to clear his reputation. What would Deane do to clear it? Tell everything
he knew about his life in Paris? Submit his record books to Congress, as he
had been asked to do so many years before? If Deane knew Bancroft was a
double agent, would he say so? And if Deane’s records mentioned the affair
of John the Painter (as indeed they did), what would happen if knowledge
of Bancroft’s role in the plot reached England? Ten years earlier, Bancroft
would have been hanged. True, the angry feelings of the war had faded, but
even if he were spared death, would Parliament grant a monopoly on color
dyes to a known traitor? Would Parliament continue the £1,000 pension? It
was one thing to have Deane living in London, where Bancroft could watch
him; it would be quite another to have him all the way across the Atlantic
Ocean, ready to tell—who knows what?

Admit it: if you were Bancroft, wouldn’t you be just a little nervous?

We are forced to consider, however reluctantly, that Deane was not
expecting to die as he walked the deck of the Boston Packet. Yet if Bancroft
did murder Deane, how? He was not aboard ship when death came and
had not seen Deane for more than a week. That is a good alibi, but then,
Bancroft was a clever man. We know (once again from the letters of John
Cutting) that Bancroft was the person who “with great humanity and equal
discretion undertook the management of the man and [the] business” of get-
ing Deane ready to leave for America. Bancroft himself wrote Jefferson that
he had been visiting Deane often “to assist him with advice, medicines, and
money for his subsistence.” If Deane were a laudanum addict, as Bancroft
hinted to Cutting, might not the good doctor who helped with “medicines”
also have procured the laudanum? And having done that, might he not eas-
ily slip some other deadly chemical into the mixture, knowing full well that
Deane would not use it until he was on shipboard and safely off to America?
That conclusion is only conjecture. We have no direct evidence to suggest
that this scenario is what really happened.

But we do know one other fact for sure; and in light of our latest the-
ory, it is an interesting one. Undeniably, Edward Bancroft was an expert on
poisons.

He did not advertise that knowledge, of course; few people in London at the
time of Deane’s death would have been likely to remember the fact. But twenty
tears earlier, the historian may recall, Bancroft wrote a book on the natural
history of Guiana. At that time he not only investigated electric eels and color
dyes, but also the poisons of the area, particularly curare (or “Woorara” as
Bancroft called it). He investigated it so well, in fact, that when he returned to
England he brought samples of curare with him, which (he announced in the
book) he had deposited with the publishers so that any gentleman of “unim-
peachable” character might use the samples for scientific study.

Furthermore, Bancroft seemed to be a remarkably good observer not only
of the poisons, but also of those who used them. His book described in ample
detail the natives’ ability to prepare poisons that,
given in the smallest quantities, produce a very slow but inevitable death, particularly a composition which resembles wheat-flour, which they sometimes use to revenge past injuries, that have been long neglected, and are thought forgotten. On these occasions they always feign an insensibility of the injury which they intend to revenge, and even repay it with services and acts of friendship, until they have destroyed all distrust and apprehension of danger in the destined victim of the vengeance. When this is effected, they meet at some festival, and engage him to drink with them, drinking first themselves to obviate suspicion, and afterwards secretly dropping the poison, ready concealed under their nails, which are usually long, into the drink.

Twenty years later Bancroft was busy at work with the color dyes he had brought back from Surinam. Had he, by any chance, also held onto any of those poisons?

Unless new evidence comes to light, we will probably never know for sure. Historians are generally forced to deal with probabilities, not certainties, and we leave you to draw your own conclusions about the death of Silas Deane.

What does seem certain is that whatever “really happened” to Deane two hundred years ago cannot be determined today without the active participation of the historian. Being courier to the past is not enough. For better or worse, historians inescapably leave an imprint as they go about their business: asking interesting questions about apparently dull facts, seeing connections between subjects that had not seemed related before, shifting and rearranging evidence until it assumes a coherent pattern. The past is not history, only the raw materials of it. How those raw materials come to be fashioned and shaped is the central concern of this book.

Additional Reading

The historian proposing the possibility of foul play on the Boston Packet is Julian Boyd. He makes his case in a series of three articles titled “Silas Deane: Death by a Kindly Teacher of Treason?” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 16 (1959): 165–187, 319–342, and 515–550. Edward Bancroft’s role as double agent was not established conclusively until the 1890s. His connections to the British are spelled out in Paul L. Ford, Edward Bancroft’s Narrative of the Objects and Proceedings of Silas Deane (Brooklyn, NY, 1891). Further background on Bancroft’s youth may be gained, of course, from his lively Essay on the Natural History of Guiana in South America (London, 1769).

Boyd’s case for murder has been questioned by William Stinchcombe in “A Note on Silas Deane’s Death,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 32 (1975): 619–624. Stinchcombe has suggested that, contrary to Boyd’s
suggestion, Deane did not face any really hopeful prospects for success in America. If Deane continued to be down on his luck when he departed for America, then the suicide theory again becomes more probable. For a third opinion, consult D. K. Anderson and G. T. Anderson, "The Death of Silas Deane," *New England Quarterly* 62 (1984): 98–105. The Andersons surveyed several medical authorities and concluded that Deane may well have suffered from chronic tuberculosis and died from a stroke or some other acute attack.